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521 threats tracked across 12 launch stacks — sourced from NVD, GHSA, CISA KEV, OSV, npm Audit, and EPSS.

521threats · All threats· page 15/27
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Gradio Vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via Crafted Zip Bomb

A vulnerability in the dataframe component of gradio-app/gradio (version git 98cbcae) allows for a zip bomb attack. The component uses pd.read_csv to process input values, which can accept compressed files. An attacker can exploit this by uploading a maliciously crafted zip bomb, leading to a server crash and causing a denial of service.

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vLLM Allows Remote Code Execution via Mooncake Integration

Summary When vLLM is configured to use Mooncake, unsafe deserialization exposed directly over ZMQ/TCP will allow attackers to execute remote code on distributed hosts. Details 1. Pickle deserialization vulnerabilities are well documented. 2. The mooncake pipe is exposed over the network (by design to enable disaggregated prefilling across distributed environments) using ZMQ over TCP, greatly increasing exploitability. ~~Further, the mooncake integration opens these sockets listening on all interfaces on the host, meaning it can not be configured to only use a private, trusted network.~~ Only sender_socket and receiver_ack are allowed to be accessed publicly, while the data actually decompressed by pickle.loads() comes from recv_bytes. Its interface is defined as self.receiver_socket.connect(f\"tcp://{d_host}:{d_rank_offset + 1}\"), where d_host is decode_host, a locally defined address 192.168.0.139,from mooncake.json (https://github.com/kvcache-ai/Mooncake/blob/main/doc/en/vllm-integration-v0.2.md?plain=1#L36). 3. The root problem is recv_tensor() calls _recv_impl which passes the raw network bytes to pickle.loads(). Additionally, it does not appear that there are any controls (network, authentication, etc) to prevent arbitrary users from sending this payload to the affected service. Impact This is a remote code execution vulnerability impacting any deployments using Mooncake to distribute KV across distributed hosts. Remediation This issue is resolved by https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/14228

OWASP A08LLM05 · Supply ChainOWASP LLM
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vLLM denial of service via outlines unbounded cache on disk

Impact The outlines library is one of the backends used by vLLM to support structured output (a.k.a. guided decoding). Outlines provides an optional cache for its compiled grammars on the local filesystem. This cache has been on by default in vLLM. Outlines is also available by default through the OpenAI compatible API server. The affected code in vLLM is vllm/model_executor/guided_decoding/outlines_logits_processors.py, which unconditionally uses the cache from outlines. vLLM should have this off by default and allow administrators to opt-in due to the potential for abuse. A malicious user can send a stream of very short decoding requests with unique schemas, resulting in an addition to the cache for each request. This can result in a Denial of Service if the filesystem runs out of space. Note that even if vLLM was configured to use a different backend by default, it is still possible to choose outlines on a per-request basis using the guided_decoding_backend key of the extra_body field of the request. This issue applies to the V0 engine only. The V1 engine is not affected. Patches https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/14837 The fix is to disable this cache by default since it does not provide an option to limit its size. If you want to use this cache anyway, you may set the VLLM_V0_USE_OUTLINES_CACHE environment variable to 1. Workarounds There is no way to workaround this issue in existing versions of vLLM other than preventing untrusted access to the OpenAI compatible API server. References

HTTP Proxy bypass using IPv6 Zone IDs in golang.org/x/net

Matching of hosts against proxy patterns can improperly treat an IPv6 zone ID as a hostname component. For example, when the NO_PROXY environment variable is set to "*.example.com", a request to "[::1%25.example.com]:80` will incorrectly match and not be proxied.

OWASP A03LLM01 · Prompt InjectionOWASP Web
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Django vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

An issue was discovered in Django 5.1 before 5.1.7, 5.0 before 5.0.13, and 4.2 before 4.2.20. The django.utils.text.wrap() method and wordwrap template filter are subject to a potential denial-of-service attack when used with very long strings.

vllm: Malicious model to RCE by torch.load in hf_model_weights_iterator

Description The vllm/model_executor/weight_utils.py implements hf_model_weights_iterator to load the model checkpoint, which is downloaded from huggingface. It use torch.load function and weights_only parameter is default value False. There is a security warning on https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/generated/torch.load.html, when torch.load load a malicious pickle data it will execute arbitrary code during unpickling. Impact This vulnerability can be exploited to execute arbitrary codes and OS commands in the victim machine who fetch the pretrained repo remotely. Note that most models now use the safetensors format, which is not vulnerable to this issue. References https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/generated/torch.load.html Fix: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/12366

OWASP A08LLM05 · Supply ChainOWASP LLM
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Django has a potential denial-of-service vulnerability in IPv6 validation

An issue was discovered in Django 5.1 before 5.1.5, 5.0 before 5.0.11, and 4.2 before 4.2.18. Lack of upper-bound limit enforcement in strings passed when performing IPv6 validation could lead to a potential denial-of-service attack. The undocumented and private functions clean_ipv6_address and is_valid_ipv6_address are vulnerable, as is the django.forms.GenericIPAddressField form field. (The django.db.models.GenericIPAddressField model field is not affected.)

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Gradio Blocked Path ACL Bypass Vulnerability

Summary Gradio's Access Control List (ACL) for file paths can be bypassed by altering the letter case of a blocked file or directory path. This vulnerability arises due to the lack of case normalization in the file path validation logic. On case-insensitive file systems, such as those used by Windows and macOS, this flaw enables attackers to circumvent security restrictions and access sensitive files that should be protected. This issue can lead to unauthorized data access, exposing sensitive information and undermining the integrity of Gradio's security model. Given Gradio's popularity for building web applications, particularly in machine learning and AI, this vulnerability may pose a substantial threat if exploited in production environments. Affected Version Gradio <= 5.6.0 Impact Unauthorized Access: Sensitive files or directories specified in blocked_paths can be accessed by attackers. Data Exposure: Critical files, such as configuration files or user data, may be leaked. Security Breach: This can lead to broader application or system compromise if sensitive files contain credentials or API keys. Root Cause The blocked_paths parameter in Gradio block's initial configuration is designed to restrict user access to specific files or directories in the local file system. However, it does not account for case-insensitive operating systems, such as Windows and macOS. This oversight enables attackers to bypass ACL restrictions by changing the case of file paths. Vulnerable snippet: ``python https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/blob/main/gradio/utils.py#L1500-L1517 def is_allowed_file( path: Path, blocked_paths: Sequence[str | Path], allowed_paths: Sequence[str | Path], created_paths: Sequence[str | Path], ) -> tuple[ bool, Literal["in_blocklist", "allowed", "created", "not_created_or_allowed"] ]: in_blocklist = any( is_in_or_equal(path, blocked_path) for blocked_path in blocked_paths ) if in_blocklist: return False, "in_blocklist" if any(is_in_or_equal(path, allowed_path) for allowed_path in allowed_paths): return True, "allowed" if any(is_in_or_equal(path, created_path) for created_path in created_paths): return True, "created" return False, "not_created_or_allowed" ` Gradio relies on is_in_or_equal to determine if a file path is restricted. However, this logic fails to handle case variations in paths on case-insensitive file systems, leading to the bypass. Proof of Concept (PoC) Steps to Reproduce Deploy a Gradio demo app on a case-insensitive operating system (e.g., Windows or macOS). `bash import gradio as gr def update(name): return f"Welcome to Gradio, {name}!" with gr.Blocks() as demo: gr.Markdown("Start typing below and then click Run to see the output.") with gr.Row(): inp = gr.Textbox(placeholder="What is your name?") out = gr.Textbox() btn = gr.Button("Run") btn.click(fn=update, inputs=inp, outputs=out) demo.launch(blocked_paths=['resources/admin'], allowed_paths=['resources/']) ` Set up the file system: Create a folder named resources in the same directory as the app, containing a file 1.txt. Inside the resources folder, create a subfolder named admin containing a sensitive file credential.txt (this file should be inaccessible due to blocked_paths). Perform the attack: Access the sensitive file using a case-altered path: ` http://127.0.0.1:PORT/gradio_api/file=resources/adMin/credential.txt ` Expected Result Access to resources/admin/credential.txt should be blocked. Actual Result By altering the case in the path (e.g., adMin), the blocked ACL is bypassed, and unauthorized access to the sensitive file is granted. !image-20241119172439042 This demonstration highlights that flipping the case of restricted paths allows attackers to bypass Gradio's ACL and access sensitive data. Remediation Recommendations 1. Normalize Path Case: Before evaluating paths against the ACL, normalize the case of both the requested path and the blocked paths (e.g., convert all paths to lowercase). Example: `python normalized_path = str(path).lower() normalized_blocked_paths = [str(p).lower() for p in blocked_paths] `` 2. Update Documentation: Warn developers about potential risks when deploying Gradio on case-insensitive file systems. 3. Release Security Patches: Notify users of the vulnerability and release an updated version of Gradio with the fixed logic. ##

OWASP A01LLM06 · Sensitive Info DisclosureOWASP LLM
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Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto

Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/crypto@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance.

OWASP A01LLM06 · Sensitive Info DisclosureOWASP Web
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Django SQL injection in HasKey(lhs, rhs) on Oracle

An issue was discovered in Django 5.1 before 5.1.4, 5.0 before 5.0.10, and 4.2 before 4.2.17. Direct usage of the django.db.models.fields.json.HasKey lookup, when an Oracle database is used, is subject to SQL injection if untrusted data is used as an lhs value. (Applications that use the jsonfield.has_key lookup via __ are unaffected.)

OWASP A03OWASP Web
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Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Hugging Face Transformers

Hugging Face Transformers Trax Model Deserialization of Untrusted Data Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Hugging Face Transformers. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file. The specific flaw exists within the handling of model files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in deserialization of untrusted data. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-25012.

OWASP A08LLM05 · Supply ChainOWASP LLM
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Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Hugging Face Transformers

Hugging Face Transformers MaskFormer Model Deserialization of Untrusted Data Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Hugging Face Transformers. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file. The specific flaw exists within the parsing of model files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in deserialization of untrusted data. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-25191.

OWASP A08LLM05 · Supply ChainOWASP LLM
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Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Hugging Face Transformers

Hugging Face Transformers MobileViTV2 Deserialization of Untrusted Data Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Hugging Face Transformers. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file. The specific flaw exists within the handling of configuration files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in deserialization of untrusted data. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-24322.

OWASP A08LLM05 · Supply ChainOWASP LLM
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Gradio vulnerable to arbitrary file read with File and UploadButton components

Summary If File or UploadButton components are used as a part of Gradio application to preview file content, an attacker with access to the application might abuse these components to read arbitrary files from the application server. Details Consider the following application where a user can upload a file and preview its content: `` import gradio as gr def greet(value: bytes): return str(value) demo = gr.Interface(fn=greet, inputs=gr.File(type="binary"), outputs="textbox") if __name__ == "__main__": demo.launch() ` If we run this application and make the following request (which attempts to read the /etc/passwd file) ` curl 'http://127.0.0.1:7860/gradio_api/run/predict' -H 'content-type: application/json' --data-raw '{"data":[{"path":"/etc/passwd","orig_name":"test.txt","size":4,"mime_type":"text/plain","meta":{"_type":"gradio.FileData"}}],"event_data":null,"fn_index":0,"trigger_id":8,"session_hash":"mnv42s5gt7"}' ` Then this results in the following error on the server ` gradio.exceptions.InvalidPathError: Cannot move /etc/passwd to the gradio cache dir because it was not uploaded by a user. ` This is expected. However, if we now remove the "meta":{"_type":"gradio.FileData"} from the request: ` curl 'http://127.0.0.1:7860/gradio_api/run/predict' -H 'content-type: application/json' --data-raw '{"data":[{"path":"/etc/passwd","orig_name":"test.txt","size":4,"mime_type":"text/plain"}],"event_data":null,"fn_index":0,"trigger_id":8,"session_hash":"mnv42s5gt7"}' ` This doesn't cause an error and results in the content of /etc/passwd being shown in the response! This works because Gradio relies on the processing_utils.async_move_files_to_cache to sanitize all incoming file paths in all inputs. This function performs the following operation ` return await client_utils.async_traverse( data, _move_to_cache, client_utils.is_file_obj_with_meta ) ` where client_utils.is_file_obj_with_meta is used as a filter which tells on which inputs to perform the _move_to_cache function (which also performs the allowed/disallowed check on the file path). The problem is that client_utils.is_file_obj_with_meta is not guaranteed to trigger for every input that contains a file path: ` def is_file_obj_with_meta(d) -> bool: """ Check if the given value is a valid FileData object dictionary in newer versions of Gradio where the file objects include a specific "meta" key, e.g. { "path": "path/to/file", "meta": {"_type: "gradio.FileData"} } """ return ( isinstance(d, dict) and "path" in d and isinstance(d["path"], str) and "meta" in d and d["meta"].get("_type", "") == "gradio.FileData" ) ` For example, as in the PoC, the file path won't be checked if the meta key is not present in the request or if _type is not gradio.FileData. Then, the path remains under control of the attacker and is used to read a file in _process_single_file function in file.py and upload_button.py (and possibly other places) PoC As described above, run the following Gradio app ` import gradio as gr def greet(value: bytes): return str(value) demo = gr.Interface(fn=greet, inputs=gr.File(type="binary"), outputs="textbox") if __name__ == "__main__": demo.launch() ` And make the following request ` curl 'http://127.0.0.1:7860/gradio_api/run/predict' -H 'content-type: application/json' --data-raw '{"data":[{"path":"/etc/passwd","orig_name":"test.txt","size":4,"mime_type":"text/plain"}],"event_data":null,"fn_index":0,"trigger_id":8,"session_hash":"mnv42s5gt7"}' `` Impact Arbitrary file read in specific Gradio applications that use File or UploadButton components to upload files and echo/preview the content to the user.

OWASP A01LLM02 · Insecure OutputOWASP LLM
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gradio Server Side Request Forgery vulnerability

In gradio <=4.42.0, the gr.DownloadButton function has a hidden server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The reason is that within the save_url_to_cache function, there are no restrictions on the URL, which allows access to local target resources. This can lead to the download of local resources and sensitive information.

OWASP A10LLM02 · Insecure OutputOWASP LLM
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Express ressource injection

A vulnerability has been identified in the Express response.links function, allowing for arbitrary resource injection in the Link header when unsanitized data is used. The issue arises from improper sanitization in Link header values, which can allow a combination of characters like ,, ;, and <> to preload malicious resources. This vulnerability is especially relevant for dynamic parameters.

OWASP A03OWASP Web
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Possible ReDoS vulnerability in HTTP Token authentication in Action Controller

There is a possible ReDoS vulnerability in Action Controller's HTTP Token authentication. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2024-47887. Impact ------ For applications using HTTP Token authentication via authenticate_or_request_with_http_token or similar, a carefully crafted header may cause header parsing to take an unexpected amount of time, possibly resulting in a DoS vulnerability. All users running an affected release should either upgrade or apply the relevant patch immediately. Ruby 3.2 has mitigations for this problem, so Rails applications using Ruby 3.2 or newer are unaffected. Rails 8.0.0.beta1 depends on Ruby 3.2 or greater so is unaffected. Releases -------- The fixed releases are available at the normal locations. Workarounds ----------- Users on Ruby 3.2 are unaffected by this issue. Credits ------- Thanks to scyoon for reporting

Possible ReDoS vulnerability in query parameter filtering in Action Dispatch

There is a possible ReDoS vulnerability in the query parameter filtering routines of Action Dispatch. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2024-41128. Impact ------ Carefully crafted query parameters can cause query parameter filtering to take an unexpected amount of time, possibly resulting in a DoS vulnerability. All users running an affected release should either upgrade or apply the relevant patch immediately. Ruby 3.2 has mitigations for this problem, so Rails applications using Ruby 3.2 or newer are unaffected. Rails 8.0.0.beta1 depends on Ruby 3.2 or greater so is unaffected. Releases -------- The fixed releases are available at the normal locations. Workarounds ----------- Users on Ruby 3.2 are unaffected by this issue. Credits ------- Thanks to scyoon for the report and patches!

Starlette Denial of service (DoS) via multipart/form-data

Summary Starlette treats multipart/form-data parts without a filename as text form fields and buffers those in byte strings with no size limit. This allows an attacker to upload arbitrary large form fields and cause Starlette to both slow down significantly due to excessive memory allocations and copy operations, and also consume more and more memory until the server starts swapping and grinds to a halt, or the OS terminates the server process with an OOM error. Uploading multiple such requests in parallel may be enough to render a service practically unusable, even if reasonable request size limits are enforced by a reverse proxy in front of Starlette. PoC ``python from starlette.applications import Starlette from starlette.routing import Route async def poc(request): async with request.form(): pass app = Starlette(routes=[ Route('/', poc, methods=["POST"]), ]) ` `sh curl http://localhost:8000 -F 'big=</dev/urandom' `` Impact This Denial of service (DoS) vulnerability affects all applications built with Starlette (or FastAPI) accepting form requests.

Showing 281–300 of 521 threats